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Who Ruled France During The Franco Prussian War

As everywhere in Europe, in Hungary, the Nation was created based on the romantic idea starting growing in importance during the 19th century, that is to say „one people, one nation”. This created a nationalist stream in the political life of the country which managed to create an independent state. At first we will define how nationalism is created and analyse the forms under which Hungarian nationalism is present or can appear in society (myths, symbols) then we will see what role is played on it by political parties of all horizons and what its influence in the political scene of the country is.

In the beginning of the 18th century, Hungary was part of the Austrian Empire, a multi-ethnic empire situated in Central Europe. Even in the Hungarian part of the Empire, many other ethnic groups were presents; the most important were the Serbs, the Croats, the Romanians, or the Slovaks. An important Hungarian liberal movement developed in the middle of the 18th century, its main figures were István Széchenyi, József Eötvös, Ferenc Deák, Lajos Kossuth and Lajos Batthyány. This period started in 1820 when the Austrian emperor was forced to convene the diet. Reforms were intended in order to reduce a few privileges of the nobility, but it was quite unsuccessful. Nevertheless, a few reforms of national character were passed. The language got unified, through literary works, and became the official language of Hungary. This oppressed a bit more the other ethnic groups present on the territory. The autonomy of Hungary was proclaimed in March 1848. Romanians and Croats who felt disadvantaged by the new nationalist policies and supported by the Habsbourg’s power attacked Hungary. A war followed and its result was a Hungarian defeat, a strict repression coming from the power from Vienna and the instauration of German as a unique language, denying all the Hungarian rights. In the following years, the habsbourg power got considerably weakened and in 1867, the Compromise was created. It created a dual monarchy, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, with Vienna and Budapest as capitals. The next important point, a sort of “key point” in modern Hungarian history, is the 1st world war. Hungary, part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was defeated, and as a consequence of the Trianon treaty lost 2/3 of his territory (Fig 1). The government of the Empire was worried about the growing nationalist feeling of the Serbs and the war was according to them, needed. The nationalist feelings everywhere in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire were manipulated and inhibited by the Europeans powers like Germany, France and Great Britain in order for each of them to get more influence. Until the Second World War, Nationalism was one of the most important topics in Hungarian politics, and under the very right wing regime of Miklós Horthy, the main goals were to recover the losses that followed the Treaty of Trianon. The alliances with Germany and Italy were proved to be successful in this revisionist perspective of recovery of territory and, since during the Second World War the Vienna Awards (fig 2) gave back to Hungary a few territories. It is important to notice that in most of the areas lost because of Trianon, Hungarians were an ethnic minority. Hungary got back to his post Trianon situation in 1945 at the end of the war. During the socialist regime, nationalism was not emphasized, because the ideology gave more important to internationalism, and to a united working class around the world. Like what Marx and Engels said: “Workers of the world, unite!”. But it was still an ideological theory that didn’t get much importance in the socialist years, just nationalist feelings got a bit weaker. And to recover the Trianon losses implies more bloody wars, which was not needed.

Now we need to focus on the contemporary post regime change Hungarian nationalism, which concerns us more directly and which is present in everyday life under different forms. Nationalism is related to national identity. There had been a need of Hungarian nationalism to create a Hungarian identity, as it is the case for most of the countries. In order to create a national identity, you need to create first a nation, that is to say to unite people around a core of things, that are considered to be common between them, and around which they are the constituting their common identity. The nation is an entity delimited by a territory, in which people can share most of the time a common culture, a common history, common origins and a common language. A nation is distinct from the individual and has sovereignty, making a nation-state. This is the romantic concept of the nation taking its deepest origins from the enlightenment period but which got importance during the 19th century in Europe. As the American writer and thinker Albert Weisbord says it „The State must have definite territorial boundaries. If there is no private property and war, there can be no State; if there is no State, there can be no “nation.” The State is no the product of the “nation,” the “nation” is the product of the State. In other words, the “nation” must not only have a common kindred base but be composed of both rulers and ruled bound together by blood ties and having a common language, heritage, tradition, culture, and sets of customs.” If needed, in order to strengthen the national feeling, myths are somewhat added to history, a few historical events are exaggerated or modified in order to sound more unifying or appealing. For example, in France between 1870 and 1914, that is to say from the end of the Franco Prussian war and the bloody repression of the Commune de Paris until the beginning of the first world war, the national feeling was developed based upon an exacerbation of historical myths and anecdotes, like Vercingétorix the Gaul who resisted the Roman Empire army of Caesar or even Jeanne d’Arc who became a martyr of the one hundred years war against England, after hearing the voce of god telling her to fight the English enemy. We can notice spiritual and xenophobic references in those myths, very likely to be used by right wing oriented politicians. That is the case for example of Ernest Renan, French philosopher who gave a famous conference on the idea of nation, in which he said: “The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory, this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea (…) the essential element of a nation is that all its individuals must have many things in common but it must also have forgotten many things. Every French citizen must have forgotten the night of St. Bartholemew and the massacres in the thirteenth century in the South.”. Karl Deutsch (in "Nationalism and its alternatives") suggested that a nation is "a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbours.", which is not really wrong when we see what consequences nationalism had in History (total fusion of national interests with ruling class interests in order to establish their power, generating wars, colonization…). But let us go back to what is specifically interesting us, nationalism in Hungary. Hungarian nationalism is very much similar to other European nationalisms and follows the same logic as described previously. The Hungarian identity is partly based on history, and in Hungarian history as well myths were somehow created in order to give birth to a stronger nationalist feeling, especially because a few points needed to retrace the origin of the Hungarians were missing. Hungarian history had not been invented, but there were blurry areas in it for which certainties were created. For example, the Landtaking certainly took place, but no one is able to say precisely how many people came when and why they did came, what happened before the landtaking is subject to many interpretations, Idolatry of sovereigns like King Matthias based on folk tales gives a certain image of the King but might be not exactly the reality, for a long time it was commonly believed that Hungarians are the descendants of the feared Attila the Hun (and even now in Hungary this is a fashionable version of history very popular among nationalist people), we can even mention the fantasy linguistics relating the Hungarian language to ancient prestigious languages like Sumerian or Hun language, and that way relating those people genetically. Recent fantasy theories even pretend that Hungarians come from the star Sirius… Imagination and fantasy were present, and a few facts were obviously too ludicrous and therefore happened to be wrong. Also symbols are needed to unite people, and most of the time for each state there is a flag, a coat of arms and an anthem. Those three main symbols are interesting and vary according to the country. In Hungary for example, the flag made its first appearance during the 1848 revolution but was only adopted after the compromise. It is a tricolour flag, inspired of the French flag supposed to represent the French revolutionary ideas, as for many other tricolour flags in the world. There is sometimes the coat of arms on it. The coat of arms in interesting and somehow is an anachronism. Most of the symbols in it are taken from the middle ages and are not representative of any republican ideals. The crown of Saint Stephen is the most troubling example. On the left there are the stripes of the Árpád dynasty and on the right the double cross is a religious symbol. The anthem “himnusz” is also interesting as it is a prayer to God. An unofficial anthem called “szózat” is also often used and is an ode to the greatness of the country. In most of the countries the anthem emphasized the supposed greatness of the nation. Hungary has no motto. Symbols can also be subject to polemic, according to the way they were used in the past. That is to say their meaning is not eternal, and can change as times goes by. In Hungary, many symbols were used by authoritarian nationalist powers basing their policy on some kind of race hierarchy in the 20th century. The Árpád stripes flag is very commonly used by right wing nationalists because of many reasons : they are a “light” version of the forbidden flag of the arrowed cross party, the Hungarian Nazi party during the second world war, but also because it represents Hungary from the pre-Trianon period when it was still a very important power in Europe, whatever what the situation is now. The love for one’s motherland, language, culture, literature and historical development, in the respect and brotherhood with other peoples has no connection with this second type of reactionary nationalism which is self centred, full of isolationist, anti-foreign and sectarianist national prejudices.

We can commonly see nowadays in Hungary an expansion of this revengeful nationalist feeling taking a greater Hungary as an illusionary plan for the future. This leads us to make an assessment of the years since the regime change to try to understand why there is such a regain in exacerbated nationalist feelings. Since the regime change, two streams are dominating the political life. The political forces that were until 1990 qualified of democratic, split with on one side the reforming social-democrats, who encouraged a mutation of the political structures but happened to turn into a social-liberal stream, and on the other side the more radical right wing traditional forces, rejecting any “leftist” policy. With the confusion generated by the policies lead by supposed “socialist” governments that are actually neo-liberal and populist discourses of the right and far right sounding even more leftist than what is supposed to come from a socialist’s mouth, the political issues are confused and political life seems to be behind a smokescreen. This opens the way for the most ultra-rightist political groups, surfing on the nationalist wave to unite people around them. For them, the cause of all the suffering of Hungarian people is the weakening of the Hungarian national identity created by the fact it joined the EU and by the fault of the minorities. Day after day, tougher and tougher nationalist small groups and militias were created, threatening openly Jews, roma people, foreigners, politicians, journalists, or everything that does not correspond to their ideal fantasy : a greater, white, catholic and ethnically pure Hungary (even though a few of them claim a return to the pre-Christian pagan traditions, characteristic of the European neo-rightist ideologies). Symbols of this neo-fascist ideology are more and more commonly seen in the streets : baseball caps of the arrowed cross party, Árpád flags, greater Hungary stickers on cars, t-shirts with allusions to a greater white Hungary, Pin’s, even Nazis symbols. Of course the majority of the people do not wear all this, but there is a spread of this phenomenon which is expanding and to any kind of people. The popular layers of the society who are the most suffering the liberal policies of the government are politically migrating to the conservative and reactionary right wing, as a result of the prevailing disappointment and confusion. Unemployed people, pensioners and dropouts are more likely to being seduced by those fascistic nationalist ideas nowadays. They might not accept them, they still don’t condemn them. This is mainly spreading among young people, may they leave school early or finish university, their discourse is more and more radical and they show more proudly nationalist symbols. Even in the best universities of the country, we can hear calls for the overthrowing of the government, prejudices against minorities, calls for hatred towards the neighbouring countries or an affirmation of the absolute Christianity of Hungary. This right wing radicalisation is especially present in the History departments of the universities where often, the deeds of the Hungarian people and leaders are emphasized, the shoah is minimized, and the Trianon Treaty and the neighbouring people are accused of all the pains of Hungarians. It can be explained by the fact that the political conscience of the youth, who are more concerned by consumerism than politics, is awakened by those reactionary ideas, and unfortunately those ideas are becoming the base and the referential of a new generation of Hungarians. The nationalist forces got stronger since 2006 and the leaked speech of the socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, from which they remember the sentence “we lied (…) we screwed it”. Demonstrations followed in front of the parliament, and the participants were mainly members of ultra right nationalist groups. The main nationalist groups are
MIEP (the party of Hungarian truth, justice and life), formed in 1993, its leader is Istvan Csurka, whose discourse is especially anti-Semitic.
The movement of the youth of the 64 counties of the historical Hungary, formed by an ex MIEP.
Jobbik, the most popular one, meaning “the right one” They are all nostalgic of the Horthy period or more especially of the anti-Semitic leader Szálasi of the Nazi Arrowed cross party, their discourse is anti-Semitic, ultra nationalist and anti occidental. The opportunity seems too good for the conservative leader of FIDESZ Orbán Viktor to use instrumentalism on the movement, not condemning it and trying to get favourable opinion from those ultra-rightists adding nationalism, populist demagogy and lies to its speeches, and getting along quite well with those formations. A strategy which seems to be working quite good especially with the crisis touching Hungary and the new betrayal of the so-called socialist political forces in their IMF-influenced anti-crisis plan. If national election were to be held right now, FIDESZ would get more than 75 percent of the votes, according to recent polls. Those nationalist discourses and policies have already had and will have negative consequences on the neighbouring area, as we know that Serbia, Slovakia and also Romania are not saints on this point either. We can recall the diplomatic crisis with the Slovak neighbour where such nationalist trends are also fashionable. The Slovak police went to hit Hungarian football fans in Slovakia, and a few days later, an extremist rightist Hungarian group got arrested in Slovakia which made extremist groups go to close five border posts with Slovakia. The Slovak nationalist leader Ján Slota even mentioned once Slovak tanks in Budapest. In Hungary, political manipulations, a dangerous nationalist agitation giving place to violence towards minorities and riots, and interethnic tensions in the surrounding area are a call for vigilance in this central Europe which after the regime change seems to be never ceasing to look in the rear-view mirror of history.

Hungarian nationalism had been very much comparable with other 19th century European nationalisms since its formation and for a long time. Its purpose was to create a unity of people behind an idea of nation. Whose interests were involved in this creation of a national identity at that time is not the issue, but since 1990 and the regime change, Hungarian nationalism seemed to have been manipulated by the new Hungarian democratic forces, who seem to have gone a little bit too far when we see that nationalist feelings now exacerbated in the worst way, with the general feeling of disappointment in this new democracy we can feel among many people, seem to be somehow one of the only things that can unite people in Hungary and in countries with similar history. Reassembling people around such values as race hierarchy, xenophobic attitudes, hatred of the other, revisionism and anti-Semitism is a dangerous thing but is growing in influence in Hungarian political life. With capitalism dividing people cultivating their differences, making them selfish and left-wing ideologies being held as responsible for the current bad situation, it seems to be unfortunately the logical continuation of the evolution of minds, to be attracted by these nationalist ideas.

Introduction

 When the Versailles Treaty was signed in Paris in 1919 formally ending the First World War, there were some forwarding thinking observers who saw in the document the “seeds of the next war.”  These foreign policy soothsayers saw the punitive measures of economic sanctions and harsh military restrictions leveled against The Second Reich, not to mention the infamous “War Guilt Clause”, as the fostering agents of German resentment.  While Germany was far from being an innocent bystander in the outbreak of the Great War and was undeniably a central player, indeed a Central Power, in the unfolding drama, it should be remembered that the geopolitical atmosphere of the day was ripe for the tragic harvest that was ultimately reaped.  Yes, Germany was very much responsible, but she was not alone in that responsibility.  However, looking back even further in time it is possible to perhaps ascribe to Germany a special level of blame.  Some five decades prior to the assassination of the Archduke of Austria, Franz Ferdinand, and the events put into motion by that act, including the German invasion of France, the quest for expansion and hegemony was preparing to embark from the halls of Prussia. Prussia was the largest and most dominant of the fractured German states, save the multi-national empire of Austria.  Steeled by its military resolve in the Seven Years War and flush with the territories granted to it on the Rhine by the Congress of Vienna, Prussia looked to unite its own territories and even all of those little Germany’s not under the Habsburg crown (or perhaps even parts of those) into one national German empire.  To that end, the Prussian Minister-President appointed in 1862, Otto von Bismarck, began a series of machinations that would culminate in that result, doing so with “blood and iron.”  Through a series of carefully staged and swift wars, Bismarck’s plan was put into action.  The final step in making a German empire a reality, and the battle with the most far reaching future ramifications, was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.  What were the specific causes of that conflict and what exactly were those far reaching ramifications?  As previously mentioned a desire for German empire, especially by Bismarck, played a leading role but the conditions for such an adventure had to be present…and they were.  Political situations in both Prussia, and the greater Germany, and in France helped pave the way to conflict, as did the aggressive foreign policies of those nations, and indeed, of Europe as a whole.  These facts together with and relating to, the succession of the Spanish crown sparked the Franco-Prussian War.  When the dust had settled, the results would have so lasting an impact, especially in terms of continued animosity between Germany and France and the upset of balance of power politics in Europe, that Henry Kissinger would be lead to call the conflict the start of the “modern Hundred Years’ War that did not end until 1945.”

 Napoleon III & France

 In 1870 France was ruled by the Second Empire of Napoleon III, whose rise to power must have seemed as stunning to him as to anyone.  In the intervening years of the rules Napoleon I and Napoleon III, France was controlled by monarchies.  During these years, because of his family relation to the more famed Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon was forbidden from living in France.  For much of his life he was an itinerate wannabe, living at various times in England, Germany, Italy, and the United States, attempting to trade on his famous uncle’s name.   Much of his globetrotting days were spent in Italy where he conspired with the Carbonari for the unification of the peninsula.  More than once he attempted to return to France, the first time as little more than a tourist, but the second in an attempt to foster a Bonapartist rebellion.  Incarcerated after this failed adventure, he escaped from prison disguised as a construction worker.  After “failure at everything he turned his hand to” his break finally came in 1848 when a revolution in France had swept aside the monarchy and reforms allowed him to return.[1]  A French Republic had been established and it would need a president.  Putting his name recognition to good use, Louis-Napoleon “won [the election] by a landslide in December 1848, receiving 74 percent of votes cast.”[2]  Domestic politics in France, as well as Prussia, during this period were marked by the competing principles of the emerging liberal-social ideals and the traditional conservative interests of the aristocracy and military.  From the start of his tenure as president, Louise-Napoleon demonstrated a political deftness in being able to play both sides.  To the conservatives he offered sound economic policies and support for the military and to the liberals he offered social reforms and public works projects to improve French infrastructure and provide jobs.  Things were going well in France, but the constitution of the Second Republic did not allow the president to run for a second term.  Louis-Napoleon, in the interest of preserving prosperity staged a coup in 1852, allowing him to remain in power and within a year dissolved the republic, established the French Second Empire and proclaimed himself Emperor Napoleon III.  Even after this brash maneuver, he still maintained popularity.  However, over time his authoritarian rule came to be resented by the liberals and many in the middle class and domestic political unrest started to simmer.

 In the realm of foreign policy Napoleon III is remembered for a number of adventures, some successful and some having unforeseen and detrimental consequences.  He successfully concluded an alliance with England to oppose and defeat Russia in the Crimean War, but had also foolishly embarked on a military adventure in Mexico which ended disastrously.  As emperor he also continued to meddle in Italian politics, alternately supporting and condemning the unification of the peninsula.  He “secretly agreed on a joint campaign by France and Sardinia to expel Austria from Italy and to establish an Italian federation of four states under the presidency of the pope,” (Columbia Encyclopedia) but in doing so, he removed any hope of having Austria as an ally in the future, a fact that would have dire consequences.[3]  Much as he had done in his domestic policies, he tried play both sides of the Italian issue, and though he eventually praised the unification, drawing the ire of pope Pius IX who “accused the emperor of having ‘feigned’ to protect him,” this resulted in merely another European power to have to deal with and opened the door for German unification.[4]  To that end, when Prussia went to war first with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein and then with Austria over the same region, France remained on the sidelines, further isolating her from Austria.  By the late 1860’s the French were becoming impatient with not only Napoleon’s domestic policies, but the loss of prestige on the Continental stage as well.  The Mexican debacle and the unchecked rise of Prussian power had the masses calling for war.  Even Napoleon’s wife Eugénie de Montijo encouraged a confrontation with Prussia.  With all the turmoil at home and abroad, Napoleon III reluctantly conceded that war may be the only way to unify the French people.

 Bismarck & Prussia

 The rise of Prussia was surprising to many in Europe.  As Koch cited The Times of London, “How she became an empire history tells us, why she remains so, no one can tell.”[5]  While Prussia did gradually increase in power and influence starting about the 18th century, her larger ambition was held in check for much of this time by the balance of power system of Europe.  At the Congress of Vienna she was made a part of the German Confederation, a loose alliance of Prussia, Austria, and the other smaller Germanic states.  The confederation was in large part an effort to contain France after the Napoleonic Wars, but it was marked by a rivalry between Prussia and Austria as to which would be the dominant German power.  Prussia had been ruled by the Hohenzollern monarchy for centuries who kept close ties with the conservative landed gentry known as Junkers, and as in France during this same period, liberals and the bourgeois sought reforms from the ruling classes.  Also as in France, revolution came to Prussia in 1848.  Poor harvests all over Europe and the lack of real political freedom had spurred the people to action against the entrenched ruling classes and shrewd political opportunists used the uprisings for their own gain.  Opportunists like Louis-Napoleon in France and Otto von Bismarck in Prussia.

 In 1862 Bismarck was appointed Minister-President of Prussia by King William I as a bulwark against the liberal interests in parliament.  As such, Bismarck did pretty much what he wanted regardless of the liberal outcry.  As a Prussian parliamentarian and a Junker, he sided with the conservative interests on most things, but also aggressively pursued the cause of German unification, a desire shared by many liberals, though their methods of achieving it differed from his.  As Michael Sturmer recorded:

Having been in the Wilhelmstrasse for only a few days, Bismarck fired the opening shot of his grand strategy in the budget committee of the Prussian parliament, “It is no through speeches and majority voting that the great questions of our time are answered-that has been the great illusion of 1848-49-but through iron and blood.”  The liberals were duly shocked, but they also wanted national unification, if necessary through a military showdown.[6]

 Bismarck clearly wanted the unification of Germany, but only on Prussian terms and under Prussian auspices.  This would require the marginalization of the other dominant German power, Austria.  In 1864 Bismarck made the first of his moves, allying with Austria against Denmark for control of Schleswig-Holstein.  The war resulted in joint rule of the region by Austria and Prussia, but that relationship would not remain cordial.  Sturmer explains, “Bismarck ensured that harmony between Vienna and Berlin…was not to last.”[7]  Prussia had to assert itself as the rightful German hegemon.  Not unlike Napoleon III in France, Bismarck was not afraid to work with the liberals and offer concessions, at least when it coincided with his interests.  Sturmer goes on, “[Bismarck] started a sweeping campaign for an all-German parliament.  This was impossible for Austria to accept, since direct elections throughout the far-flung and diverse possessions of the Habsburg Empire would have the beginning of the end [for Austria].”[8]  Bismarck made an ally of Italy and went to war against Austria and most of the southern German states including Baden, Saxony, and Bavaria.  The war was swift with Prussia delivering the decisive blow at Konnigratz and achieving a victory so stunning it shocked the other powers of Europe, France in particular, who had remained on the sidelines.  The Austro-Prussian War effectively dissolved the German Confederation and in its place Bismarck formed the North German Confederation, bribing and cajoling all the German states north of the Main River to join-at least those which were not annexed outright-while still maintaining a democratic veneer, thin as it may have been.  He had a constitution drawn up for the North German Confederation that included a two house parliament, though it was still very much under the firm guidance of Prussia.  These events united the previously separated the western and eastern sections of Prussia, severely weakened Austria, and increased Prussia’s population and industrial capacity which, therefore, increased it’s ability to wage a wider war.

 Bismarck’s Machinations  

  However, for obvious reasons, it also drove a further wedge between Prussia and the southern German states.  They already had a low opinion of Prussia before the events of the 1860’s many considering “Prussia a foreign country, and [calling] it Stinkpreusse -”Putrid Prussia.”[9]  In addition, much of the South was Catholic and the majority of the North German Confederation was Protestant.  Bismarck had to find a way to draw those states into closer orbit with Prussia before full unification could be completed.  According to Gordon Craig he counted on three things to accomplish this: 

the collaboration in security arrangements made possible by the offensive-defensive treaties, which he hoped would kindle a desire for other joint undertakings; the attractions of the constitution of the North German Confederation, which offered its members the advantages of sharing in a wider community without having to give up their uniqueness; and the pressure of economic interest.[10]

 But even more than that, Bismarck knew he would require some great catalyst to drive those southern states into the Prussian fold to stay.  France was the obvious vehicle.

 As discussed early, France watched with a combination of astonishment and rage at Prussia’s meteoric ascent.  No longer could she claim to be the clear dominant power of the Continent.  As GeofferyWawro explains, “Whereas Prussia had counted…less than half [the inhabitants of France] in 1860, the Austro-Prussian War and the annexations nearly evened the score, giving the North German Confederation a population of 30 million to France’s 38 million and-thanks to Prussian use of universal conscription-an army one-third larger than France’s.”[11] Napoleon III was pressured from all sides to stand firm against further Prussian adventures.  Even in his own home he couldn’t escape the call for action as his wife was a virulent anti-Prussian.  Unfortunately, Napoleon’s attempts at firmness played beautifully into Bismarck’s hand.  In 1867 France tried to purchase Luxembourg and requested Bismarck’s help in doing so.  The Prussian Minister-President refused and made sure the German press made a media circus out of the affair, stirring up German resentment of France, particularly in the South.  Between 1867 and 1870 a number of similar incidents manifested themselves-such as a Prussian sponsored railway through Switzerland and a German “customs union” including the southern German states-and threatened war, but each time peace prevailed.  Though Bismarck may have believed a war with France was the most likely scenario to complete unification, he wasn’t about to launch into it headlong.  He was shrewd enough to know that the balance of power must still be preserved, or at least perceived preserved, or the other powers may join with France against him.  If unification could be accomplished without war, so much the better, but a conflict appeared imminent.

 Bismarck’s prime opportunity to press the issue was unlikely and unexpected.  In 1868 Queen Isabella II of Spain had been deposed and the Spanish provisional government offered the throne to Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who happened to be the nephew of Prussian King William I.   Unenthusiastic at the prospect, Leopold declined the invitation.  However, the Spanish provisional government was persistent and again made the offer.  Craig notes that, “Bismarck never for a moment doubted that Leopold’s succession to the throne would present him with dangers and opportunities.”[12]  The Minister-President saw his chance to put the screws to France.  If Leopold accepted the Spanish offer France would find itself situated in the middle of two Hohenzollern monarchies, a strategically untenable position.  With the hawks in the French press and government continuing to put pressure on Napoleon III to stand up to Prussia, Bismarck went to work.  He encouraged Leopold and the King to accept the offer from Spain, which they did.  When word reached France of the deal the hawks were outraged.  The two most outspoken and important in terms of their influence on the Emperor were the aforementioned Empress Eugenie, herself “a Spaniard by birth, who particularly resented Bismarck’s meddling in Madrid” and the foreign minister Duc Antoine de Gramont a hard-line, anti-Prussian.[13]  He immediately began to attack Bismarck in the press and dispatched the French ambassador to Prussia to see King William I to persuade him to renounce Leopold’s claim and coax him to step down.  King William, never enthusiastic about the prospect to begin with, caved.  Leopold’s father withdrew him from consideration and the matter appeared to be settled.  However, Gramont could not leave well enough alone.  As Craig noted, “where a sense of measure might have crowned his career with a brilliant success, he overreached and tumbled his nation into disaster.”[14] As Wawro explains, Gramont demanded that “King Wilhelm I would have to sign and publish a document linking himself with the renunciation and pledging that Prussia would never again offer candidates for the Spanish throne.”[15]  These demands were of course a great insult and “the King refused, politely but firmly, to give any such thing.”[16]  King William sent a telegram to Bismarck explaining the conversation, and the Minister-President seized on it as another opportunity to jab at France.  While this insult to the king may have been enough of a pretext for war against France in and of itself, Bismarck had other plans.  He had worked for the past several years to paint France as the true aggressor and he was not about to throw all that hard work away now.  Wawro explains that “he was determined to make the French declare war on Prussia, so as to trigger the south German alliances and ensure the neutrality of the other great powers.”[17]  To that end, Bismarck “condensed the Ems telegram for publication, so reducing and abridging it that it seemed to newspaper readers as if a curt exchange had occurred at Ems, in which the Prussians believed that their king had been insulted and the French believed that their ambassador had been snubbed.”[18]

 It is worth noting here Craig’s warning that “it is always dangerous to speak with too great assurance of Bismarck’s intentions” and his caution to assume that Bismarck “was seeking war with France from the beginning of the Spanish question.”[19]  While it is true that Bismarck did not much concern himself with the matter at first, this can be explained by the fact that Leopold had initially declined the Spanish invitation.  Once the throne was offered a second time Bismarck grasped the opportunity with both hands.  As Wawro wrote, “Working patiently for the war with France that might unite the German states, Bismarck saw in the unfolding Spanish crown question another useful provocation.”[20]  Given the tenuous state of relations between France and Prussia after the Austro-Prussian War and the previously discussed incidents between them during that period, most baring Bismarck’s fingerprints, there can be little doubt that Bismarck’s objective was war.

 War & Empire           

 Bismarck’s gambit paid off.  France declared war on Prussia in July of 1870.  The south German states pledged allegiance to Prussia and no other powers came to the assistance of France.  The superior organization and Krupp artillery pieces of the Prussian and German armies made short work of the French forces.  In September the main French army was destroyed at Sedan and Napoleon III himself was captured.  Back in Paris the Second Empire was overthrown and the Third Republic took its place.  Tragically, even though “the French armies dissolved, Paris refused to capitulate.  For four months it was surrounded and besieged.”[21]

Bismarck had succeeded in uniting all German states, except for Austria, into one empire.  All that remained was the crowning of an Emperor to rule it, King William I of Prussia.  However, this was a development not embraced by the King.  As Tyler Whittle recounts, “[The King] had no desire, he declared, to trade the splendid crown of Prussia for a crown of filth.”[22]  After some persuading from Bismarck and the Crown Prince the king relented.  Whittle explains:

Thus it was on January 18th, 1871 the grumpy King of Prussia stood on a dais in the Galerie des Glaces, Versailles, listened first to a chorale chanted by a military choir, then to an exhortation from his Court Chaplain, then to the singing of “Now thank we all our God”, and afterwards read out load a declaration that the German Empire had been re-established.  To a frantic waving of swords and helmets and the rolling of drums, a military band burst into patriotic music, and the Crown Prince kissed his father’s hand, followed by all the other Princes present.  At the conclusion of the ceremony the new German Emperor wrote to his wife that he had passed the most unhappy day of his life.[23]

 Aftermath

 The Franco-Prussian War would have an enormous effect on the immediate and distant fate of Europe.  The most obvious of these effects being the emergence of the German Empire as one of the most, if not the, most powerful nation on the Continent.  Bismarck, who had become Chancellor of the German Reich, was wise enough to keep this new found power under control.  Having achieved his ultimate goal of a unified Germany and having no desire for further border expansion, he sought out alliances with other powers and concluded several treaties to assure Germany’s security.  True, he had upset the European balance of power with his expansionist wars, but afterward he rebalanced the scales, this time with Germany as one of the strongest weights.  However, when he was dismissed by King William II in 1890, that restraint went with him.  William II was determined to make Germany not only into a great European power, but a naval and colonial one as well.  His brash approach to these endeavors, particularly a naval arms race with Great Britain, would have dire consequences.

 Another consequence of the war was the effect it would have on future German generals.  As explained by Wawro, “The war thus empowered a whole class of militarists who linked Germany’s health to war and expansion.”[24]  This psychological repercussion would echo well into the twentieth century.  The vaunted German General Staff would assert itself into the policy making of the Reich-the Second and the Third-or at the very least was complicit in the blunders and crimes of the civilian leadership in an attempt to retake glory for itself on the battlefield.

 While the French Third Republic would eventually become a reborn European power in its own rite, its initial days were hampered by the huge costs of the war.  In addition to the war costs themselves was a reparations bill of five billion francs to be paid to Germany.  Reforms in the republic soon turned things around, economically, militarily, and in terms of national unity.  By the outbreak of World War I in 1914 Franc once again had a larger army than Germany.  This new found strength in France was met with surprise in Germany where “conventional wisdom in 1871 purported that with his harsh indemnity and annexations, Bismarck had ‘crippled France for thirty to fifty years.’”[25]   France’s phoenix-like rise served to keep tensions between the two rivals at a high level for the next several decades.  Adding to the enmity was the fact that Germany had annexed Alsace and Lorraine after the war.  Even though Wawro explains that “tempers had cooled considerably by 1914 when most French had reconciled themselves to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine” it was enough of a sore spot that the secret French battle plan put into action at the outset of WWI, Plan 17, called for the retaking of the region from the very start.[26]  This exercise in vengeful war planning would prove costly since the main German thrust came not through that region but through Belgium.

 Conclusion     

 It is difficult not to wonder if the repercussions of the Franco-Prussian War would not have been so far reaching, at least not as tragically so, had Bismarck remained as Chancellor after 1890.  He was 75 years old when he was forced out by Wilhelm II and would not have lived long enough to intervene in the crisis of the summer of 1914, but had he had more time to influence the second King William of Prussia, his guiding hand may have still invisibly been at the helm and steered Germany through those treacherous waters safely.  It wasn’t of course and the Second Reich found itself entangled in affairs over a region that the old Minister-President vowed he would never trade the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier for.  But even a brilliant statesman such as Bismarck can not see into the future and can never know what untold consequences his decisions may have on future generations.  The stone thrown for the unification of one nation sent ripples far out into the future that would make, shape, and destroy countless other nations the world over, causing catastrophes not thought possible by human beings and ushering in a new era of world order.

 

Bibliography

 

Craig, Gordon. Germany 1866-1945.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1978.

Koch, H.W.  A History of Prussia.  New York:  Longman, 1978.

New Advent.  “Napoleon III.”  Catholic Encyclopedia.  http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10699a.htm

 Colton, Joel, Lloyd Kramer, and Palmer, R.R.  A History of the Modern World. 10th ed. New York:  McGraw-Hill. 2007.

 Sturmer, Michael.  The German Empire 1870-1918. New York:  Random House. 2000,

 Whittle, Tyler.  The Last Kaiser:  A Biography of Wilhelm II German Emperor and King of Prussia. New York:  Times. 1977.

 Wawro, Geoffrey.  The Franco-Prussian War:  The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.  2003.

 

[1] Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War:  The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., s.v. “Napoleon III.”

 [4] New Advent, “Napoleon III,” Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10699a.htm

 [5] H.W. Koch, A History of Prussia (New York:  Longman, 1978), 250.

[6] Michael Sturmer, The German Empire 1870-1918 (New York:  Random House, 2000), 21.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 3.

[10] Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1978), 15

[11] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 19.

[12] Craig, Germany, 22.

[13] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 35.

[14] Craig, Germany, 21

[15] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 36

[16] Craig, Germany, 27

[17] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 37.

[18] Joel Colton, Lloyd Kramer, and R.R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World. 10th ed. (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2007), 531.

[19] Craig, Germany, 24.

[20] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 34.

[21] Colton, Kramer, and Palmer, History of the Modern World, 532.

[22] Tyler Whittle, The Last Kaiser A Biography of Wilhelm II German Emperor and King of Prussia (New York:  Times, 1977), 35

[23] Ibid, 36.

[24] Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 312.

[25] Ibid, 310.

[26] Ibid, 311.